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Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000200020005-7

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

65-7488

DDI 5511-65

Dear Mr. Raborn:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about the materiel assistance reaching the DRV and the Viet Cong by sea shipments through the ports of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

It is requested that you furnish the JCS as a matter of urgency the following information:

- a. A list of ships which have unloaded cargo at DRV ports or Sihanoukville during CY 1965, listed as to Free World, Soviet Bloc, or Chinese Communist origin.
- b. The cargo unloaded from these ships by type and tonnage.
- c. The disposition of the military or military-related (chemicals, medical supplies, etc.) cargo unloaded at Sihanoukville. Any information you have concerning the introduction of any of this materiel into SVN is desired.

The use of Cambodia as a supply base for the VC is of increasing concern to the JCS. Any information which you are able to develop through your sources would be of immediate interest and periodic updating of the materiel is desired.

Sincerely,

5/
JOHN P. McCONNELL
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: Dep SecDef

Honorable W. F. Raborn, Jr.
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Due to JCS by COB 28 Dec

JCS review(s) completed.

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28 December 1965

General John P. McConnell
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff


Dear General McConnell:

The attached memorandum is in response to your request of 21 December 1965, for information about material assistance reaching the DRV and the Viet Cong by sea shipments through the ports of North Vietnam and Cambodia.

As you know the possible use of Cambodia as a source of supplies for the Viet Cong is a matter for continuing concern and watchfulness throughout the intelligence community. We have, to date, been unable to support a judgment that the port of Sihanoukville is being used as a channel for any significant amount of supplies for the Viet Cong. Although some supplies for the Viet Cong are obtained from Cambodia we believe that only a small quantity is obtained in this way. It also seems unlikely that any significant amount of military supplies is obtained from Cambodia.

For your information we publish a monthly report on shipping to North Vietnam. We will also be publishing shortly a more detailed report on shipping to Cambodia during 1965. These reports and others pertaining to the use of Cambodia as a source of supplies will be

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furnished to you on a periodic basis as you have requested.

Sincerely,

William F. Raborn, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

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CARGOES MOVED THROUGH PORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND SIHANOUKVILLE, CAMBODIA,
IN 1965, AND CAMBODIA AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLIES FOR THE VIET CONG

Cargoes Moved Through Ports of North Vietnam and Sihanoukville

During 1965 there were 530 foreign merchant ship arrivals at ports of North Vietnam about half of which were Free World ships. A breakdown of these arrivals by country of registry is contained in Table 1. Identified cargoes delivered by these ships totaled 690,000 tons mostly POL, fertilizer, bulk foodstuffs and miscellaneous cargoes. Free World ships carried about 36 percent of these imports. A breakdown of identified seaborne imports is given in Table 2. None of these imports have been identified as arms or ammunition.

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During 1965 there were 280 merchant ship arrivals at Sihanoukville, Cambodia, of which 255 were Free World ships. A breakdown of these arrivals by country of registry is given in Table 3. Cargoes delivered by these ships totaled 229,000 tons, three-fourths of which were delivered by Free World ships.

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Five shipments of arms and ammunition to Sihanoukville in 1965 were identified, three of them on Chinese Communist ships and one on a Czech ship. The largest military cargo carried by these ships was 2,000 tons. A French ship delivered ten Skyraider aircraft to Sihanoukville, and several French ships carried small quantities of explosives.

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Cambodia as a Source of Supplies for the Viet Cong

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[redacted] we can not support a judgment that the ships calling at Sihanoukville during 1965 carried any significant quantity of goods for direct or indirect shipment to the Viet Cong. We estimate, however, that the Viet Cong obtain a small quantity of supplies from Cambodia. Most of the supplies are either indigenous to Cambodia or arrived through normal trade channels, but some have probably also moved in clandestine channels. These supplies are moved across the border into South Vietnam by smugglers, or Viet Cong purchasing agents. Primitive transport is used primarily.

Many of the reports concerning the possible shipment of arms to the Viet Cong through Cambodia have apparently been engendered by the deliveries, beginning in late 1964 and continuing into 1965, of weapons from Communist China to Cambodia. There has been no effort by Cambodia or Communist China, however, to conceal these military deliveries which have been in fulfillment of the Chinese Communist military aid agreement with Cambodia. This agreement calls for sufficient equipment, arms, and ammunition for 27,000 men.

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[redacted] Sihanouk has also announced the shipments and provided a breakdown of the weapons supplied. [redacted]

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[redacted] It seems unlikely that any significant amount of this equipment or ammunition has been supplied to the Viet Cong, although some of the replaced equipment may have been obtained by them through clandestine means.

The Sihanouk government has been particularly sensitive to allegations that the Viet Cong are receiving weapons via Cambodia. Recent press reports concerning the possible use of Sihanoukville by the Communists has prompted Sihanouk to ask the International Control Commission (ICC) to "control" the port. Members of the ICC have recently been in Sihanoukville inspecting manifests and making an assessment of the personnel requirements for maintaining a permanent inspection team. No matter how thorough an inspection the ICC

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is able to make, however, there is no way of guaranteeing that the Communists will not make use of Cambodia to get military supplies to the Viet Cong. Other evidence, including the fact that the Communists have devoted a considerable effort to improving and expanding their infiltration network through Laos, suggests, however, that they intend to rely on other routes, at least for the immediate future.

Most of the supplies that the Viet Cong have procured in or through Cambodia have consisted of materials that can be purchased on the open market, including food, drugs and medical supplies, and electrical equipment such as radios, batteries and tubes. Although some of these supplies are purchased in Cambodia and infiltrated into South Vietnam, the major source of these supplies for the Viet Cong is South Vietnam itself. The extent to which Cambodia is being used as a transfer area or as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess. Various reports have indicated

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that arms and ammunition have moved from Cambodia to South Vietnam. Evidence, including the testimony of numerous Viet Cong prisoners who were engaged in supply operations from Cambodia, indicates that such movements probably are small in terms of the total amount of such materials infiltrated into South Vietnam. The Communists almost certainly have the capability to increase substantially the volume of military supplies currently crossing the Cambodia - South Vietnam border, but it is doubtful that, through clandestine means alone, they could move, on a sustained basis, even the 12 tons of military supplies now needed daily by the VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam from sources outside the country. This doubt arises principally from the fact that illicit traffic of this volume could hardly clear the port of Sihanoukville without detection. If the 12 tons could be landed at Sihanoukville or other points along the coast, the Communists could undoubtedly move this tonnage forward into South Vietnam. At a minimum, however, the ability of the Communists to move goods clandestinely through Cambodia is sufficient to provide an important adjunct to infiltration of supplies by other means.

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Table 1
Foreign Flag Ship Arrivals in North Vietnam
during 1965

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Number of Arrivals</u>
Total	<u>530</u>
Free World	<u>257</u>
UK	137
Japan	37
Norway	29
Greece	28
Lebanon	9
Netherlands	5
Liberia	4
France	2
Malta	2
Cyprus	2
Panama	1
Italy	1
USSR	<u>79</u>
Eastern European Communist countries	<u>49</u>
Poland	<u>40</u>
Czechoslovakia	4
Bulgaria	4
Albania	1
Communist China	<u>143</u>
Cuba	<u>2</u>

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Table 2

Cargoes Delivered to North Vietnam by Foreign Merchant Ships in 1965 a/

000 metric tons

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Bulk Foodstuffs</u>	<u>Fertilizer</u>	<u>POL</u>	<u>Timber</u>	<u>Misc.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total by all foreign ships	<u>530</u>	<u>121.5</u>	<u>162.4</u>	<u>167.0</u>	<u>12.1</u>	<u>227.1</u>	<u>690.2</u>
Free World Ships	<u>257</u>	<u>102.8</u>	<u>58.7</u>	<u>13.4</u>	<u>3.9</u>	<u>67.5</u>	<u>246.3</u>
Communist Ships	<u>273</u>	<u>18.7</u>	<u>103.7</u>	<u>153.6</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>159.6</u>	<u>443.9</u>
Soviet	79	13.9	89.4	151.6	8.0	116.5	379.4
Chinese b/	143	1.1	--	--	--	15.7	16.8
East European	49	3.7	14.3	2.0	0.2	27.3	47.6
Cuba	2	--	--	--	--	--	--

a/ These figures are a preliminary estimate. Components may not add to totals due to rounding.

b/ Data on Chinese Communist shipping to North Vietnam is notably deficient, particularly for information on cargoes carried.

Table 3

Merchant Ship Arrivals at Sihanoukville, Cambodia
During 1965

<u>Flag</u>	<u>Number of Arrivals</u>
Total	<u>280</u>
Free World	<u>255</u>
France	60
Panama	50
United Kingdom	29
Japan	19
Yugoslavia	18
Norway	17
Greece	16
Cambodia	8
Lebanon	7
Netherlands	7
Indonesia	4
Liberia	4
Other	16
Communist countries	<u>25</u>
USSR	9
Communist China	8
Eastern Europe	8

Table 4

Cargoes Delivered at Sihanoukville, Cambodia
by Merchant Ships of All Flags in 1965

(Thousand Metric Tons)

Total Cargoes	<u>229</u>
General cargo	40
Cement	36
Coal	29
Metals	22
Rubber (for transshipment)	10
Chemicals	8
Foodstuffs	8
Unidentified	76

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1	[Redacted] R2-3		11/1/68	[Signature]	
2	DD/RR				
3					
4					
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE	
Remarks: Original of draft letter and report in response to General McConnell's request hand-carried to [Redacted] [Redacted] <u>S-1749</u> 25X1A9A					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
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